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Deuteranopia - Type of dichromatism in which red and green are confused. Syn. green blindness1

I.

Introduction and Overview
The citizens of the world are becoming more concerned about how climate
change will affect their lives. There seems to be a growing global consensus that
something should be done about greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and
climate change impacts. Mitigation (the stabilization of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere), and adaptation (the building of ecological and social community
resiliency),2 have found their way into the mainstream policy initiatives of
national governments. That something ought to be done appears to no longer
be the issue.
Instead, the current debates seem to focus on what mitigation or adaptation
measures are necessary and how these measures will be financed. In this regard,
much has been said about the fact that the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities demands that the North pays for the costs of its industrialization,
which the South is suffering for.3 While the North may grudgingly accept this,
the extent to which it must pay and the manner by which its payment must be
made is still highly contested. In addition, the North insists that the South must
also do its part in reducing emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol allowed the North to take advantage of market-based
mechanisms to comply with its emissions reductions targets. However, some
question whether such market-based policies are an effective means to bring
about the changes required to address the causes of climate change. Some may
even question the morality of placing the fate of the planet in the hands of
market forces. The growing practice of offering carbon offsets for sale in the
carbon market is part of this debate.
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2 David Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, And International Law, 15 HASTINGS
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natural ecosystems that help human communities survive through buffering from floods, filtering drinking water,
stabilizing soil, providing sustainable forest products, and preserving a host of other ecosystem services necessary
for human survival” and social resiliency as “the democratic capacity to help marginalized communities accrue
administrative, technical and political power that will help them make difficult decisions and survive the coming
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Offsets generated by projects for reducing emissions from deforestation and
degradation (“REDD”) is a particularly controversial form of carbon offset.
Excluded from the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, REDD offsets are now making
a comeback ever since the Bali Action Plan specifically referred to REDD.
Most recently, the Copenhagen Accord recognized the crucial role of REDD and
the need to enhance removals of GHG emissions by forests and agreed on the
need to provide incentives to such actions to enable the mobilization of financial
resources from developed countries.4 It would seem therefore that the issuance
and trade of REDD offsets may finds its way into the evolving international
climate change regime.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the issuance REDD offsets is
an effective climate change mitigation measure.5 In other words: Are REDD
offsets really green? Based on this evaluation, the paper also aims to provide
recommendations on the content of national legislation for REDD offsets.
Part I lays the foundation by discussing the background of the issue including
the role of forests in climate change, the perceived benefits of REDD projects,
and the pros and cons of carbon offsets. Part II discusses the arguments for and
against REDD offsets and evaluates these arguments. Part III explains what
“REDD law” should contain, in light of the evaluation in Part III and evaluates
the current major US Climate Change bills. Part IV summarizes the debate and
provides the suggested response to the question: Are REDD offsets really green?
A.

Forests, Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCC”) defines
a sink as “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse
gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere”6
while a reservoir is a “component or components of the climate system
where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.”7 A
forest is both a sink and a reservoir as it is both a mechanisms to remove
greenhouse gases and a place where carbon is stored. However, most of
the literature indicates forests as sinks. For purposes of this paper the
terms will be used interchangeably.
The statistics clearly indicate the importance of forests in dealing with
climate change. Nearly 50% “of the global terrestrial carbon pool”8 can be
found in forests. Forests “store between 20 and 100 times more carbon

4 See Advanced and Unedited Version of Copenhagen Accord available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf
5 For purposes of this paper, “effective climate change mitigation measure” is what is meant by “green.” While
REDD projects may also have adaptation effects, considering that REDD specifically refers to “reducing emissions”
then it should be evaluated as a mitigation measure.
6 Article 1.8 UNFCCC.
7 Article 1.7 UNFCCC.
8 UNEP-WCMC 2007. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation: A Key Opportunity for Attaining Multiple
Benefits. UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, U.K. 4 (2007) available at http://www.unepwcmc.org/resources/publications/unep_wcmc%20RED%20Feb07.pdf
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per unit area than croplands.”9 Forests hold a lot of the world’s carbon.
In addition to being reservoirs or sinks:
forests provide essential ecosystem services … such as watershed protection,
water flow regulation, nutrient recycling, rainfall generation and disease regulation
… Protecting tropical forests has a double-cooling effect, by reducing carbon
emissions and maintaining high levels of evaporation from the canopy.10

But this crucial role of forests is threatened by deforestation and
degradation.
Deforestation “involves a decrease in the area covered by forest”11 or “[a]
non-temporary change of land use from forest to other land use or
depletion of forest crown cover to less than 10 percent.”12 On the other
hand, forest degradation refers to the “impoverishment of standing woody
material mainly caused by human activities such as over-grazing, overexploitation (for firewood in particular), repeated fires, or due attacks by
insects, diseases, plant parasites or other natural causes such as cyclones.”13
The problem with deforestation is that it "not only releases the carbon
stored in the above ground biomass, but [it also] leads to decomposition of
root mass and mobilization of soil carbon.”14
The contribution of deforestation and forest degradation to global GHG
emissions is substantial. Statistics indicate that global GHG emissions
“from changes in land use, including tropical deforestation are estimated to
be between 18% and 25% of annual global emissions from all sources.15
To appreciate the scale by which forests are being destroyed, it should be
noted that roughly “13 million hectares – an area the size of Nicaragua –
are converted to other land uses”16 annually “making land cover change
the second largest contributor to global warming”17 and “the largest source
of [GHG] emissions in the developing world.18
B.

Understanding Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (“REDD”)

9 Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in the Forestry Sector: Conceptual and
Operational Fallacies 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 109 (1997).
10 CHARLIE PARKER ET AL, THE LITTLE REDD+ BOOK 13 (Global Canopy Programme Second Edition 2009)
(2008).
11 Jean-Paul Lanly, Forestation and Forest Degradation Factors, original and unedited version of paper submitted
before the XII World Forestry Congress 2003 available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/article/wfc/xii/ms12ae.htm accessed on 21 October 2009.
12 Annex 6: Definitions And Basic Principles Of Sustainable Forest Management In Relation To Criteria And
Indicators available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6896e/x6896e0e.htm.
13 Id.
14 Supra note 8.
15 Id.
16 Supra note 10 at 12.
17 Id.
18 Johannes Ebeling and Maı¨ Yasue´ Generating Carbon Finance Through Avoided Deforestation And Its Potential To Create
Climatic, Conservation and Human Development Benefits PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B 1917-1924, 1917 (2008).
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REDD is basically about reducing emissions by funding projects that help
countries to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation.19 In
addition, REDD also has the potential to “simultaneously address climate
change and rural poverty, while conserving biodiversity and sustaining vital
ecosystem services.”20
In terms of scope, some classify REDD activities into three types:21
• RED - This refers to reducing emissions from deforestation;
• REDD – This refers to reducing emissions from deforestation and
degradation; and
• REDD+ - This refers to reducing emissions from deforestation and
degradation and enhancement of carbon stocks.
It should be noted that the Copenhagen Accord refers to “REDD plus.”
The choice of scope is important because it will: (i) affect “the scale,
relative cost and mitigation potential of a REDD mechanism,”22 (ii) affect
the “the political feasibility of an agreement and the ability of developing
countries to measure, report and verify the options considered;”23 and
affect which countries will be benefited.24
Examples of REDD projects include:
• setting up protected forest areas;
• rehabilitating degraded forests and expanding forested areas through
plantations;
• diminishing wood wastes generated from logging or construction
operations which are left to decay.25
REDD Projects “are designed to address systematic deforestation and
degradation drivers” such as:
large scale agricultural conversion of forests, unsustainable logging,
increased access to forests due to road infrastructure expansion for
extractive use, and illegal logging. Projects also address subsistence-level
drivers, such as small-holder slash-and-burn agriculture, small-scale logging
or fuel wood collection for local use, conversion of forests to pasture land,
and unintended fires.26

B.

Why REDD Can Be Gold

Several arguments have been made regarding the benefits of REDD.

Supra note 10 at 14.
Id.
21 Supra note 10 at 20.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Supra note 9 at 110.
26 Schneider et al, Banking on the Environment: Profiting From Investment in REDD, 24 SUM Nat. Resources &
Env’t 14, 15 (2009).
19
20
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1.

Significantly reduce global GHGs
Considering roughly 20% of global GHGs come from deforestation,
curbing this would have significant impact on the amount of CO2
released into the atmosphere.
Preventing deforestation has a two-fold benefit.
It
“preserve[s][the] forests’ role as active carbon sinks and …
avoid[s] the release of their massive carbon stocks.”27
Comparing deforestation and reforestation, avoiding deforestation is
more effective “because deforestation releases significantly more
carbon into the atmosphere on a per area basis that can be
sequestered through reforestation (i.e. replanting trees on lands that
have not recently been forested) on a discounted basis.”28 In fact,
“[i]t can take over 200 years for a newly forested area to attain the
carbon storage capacity of an old growth forest, and even at
maturity, regenerated forests generally store less carbon than natural
forests.”29
Apart from CO2 “reducing deforestation can avoid major emissions
of nitrous oxide (N2O) – a GHG that is more than 300 times more
powerful than CO2 – because (at least in the tropics, where most
deforestation occurs) much of the biomass removed through
deforestation is burned.”30

2. Promotes biodiversity
Forests are natural habitats of many species. Preventing
“deforestation and wetlands conservation in particular provide
important side benefits in terms of habitat and biodiversity
conservation and environmental quality”31 and [p]rimary tropical
forests… are estimated to contain 50% to 70% of all terrestrial
species, and tropical deforestation is a major cause of biodiversity
loss.32 Thus, preserving forests also mean protection of the plant
and animal life that depend on the forest.
3. Cost efficient
Compared to the cost of building and operating carbon capture and
storage (“CCS”) facilities, REDD projects are more cost efficient.
Some estimate the “typical cost of CCS in power plants ranges from
US $30 to 90/tCO2 or even more, depending on technology, CO2

27 David J. Hayes and Joel C. Beauvais, Carbon Sequestration in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 694
(Michael Gerrard ed., 2007)
28 Id at 694-695.
29 Id.
30 Id at 695.
31 Id at 696.
32 Id.
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purity and site.”33 On the other hand “the IPCC estimates that
reductions equal to or greater than the scale suggested here could be
achieved at <U.S.$20 per ton CO2.”34
A study conducted by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change
“estimated that a forest-based sequestration program in the United
States would sequester up to 300 million tons of carbon per year
would cost between $7.50 and $22.50 per ton of CO2 equivalent.”35
The authors concluded that these costs are “not very far from typical
cost estimates for emissions abatement through fuel switching and
energy efficient improvements.”36
4. Promote sustainable development in developing countries
REDD projects also has the potential of improving the economies
of developing countries by “[p]roviding economic incentives for the
maintenance of forest cover can help tropical countries avoid these
negative impacts and meet development goals, while also
complementing aggressive efforts to reduce fossil fuel emissions.”37
REDD projects help the South to use their forests sustainably by
providing them with the resources and capacity-building they
require.
5.

Immediate GHGs reductions
The need to mitigate GHG emissions is urgent and must be done
swiftly. While technology is still being developed, existing
technologies need to be used in the short term. Because “[f]orestbased emission reductions can be generated relatively quickly, [it]
giv[es] countries a longer window of opportunity to pursue
alternative technology and development pathways to address climate
change in the medium term.”38

C.

Carbon Offsets
1. What do carbon offsets offer?
What is a carbon offset?
A carbon offset represents the reduction of one metric ton (2,205
lbs) of carbon dioxide emissions. If you develop a project that
reduces carbon dioxide emissions, every metric ton of CO2
emissions reduced results in the creation of one carbon offset.39

IEA Energy Technology Essentials (December 2006) available at http://www.iea.org/techno/essentials1.pdf.
Gullison et al, Tropical Forests and Climate Policy 316 SCIENCE 985 (2007).
35 Supra note 27 at 696.
36 Id.
37 Supra note 34 at 986.
38 Supra note 26 at 14.
39 Melissa Papke, Michigan Forests and Farms: Tapping and Marketing Our Land Resources for Carbon Sequestration, 36 MICH.
REAL PROP. REV. 61, 63 (2009).
33
34
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Types of projects that can generate offsets include:40
•
•
•
•
•

renewable energy projects;
destruction of industrial pollutants;
destruction of landfill or farm-animal generated methane;
energy efficiency and fuel switching projects; and
agricultural and forestry projects.

More specifically, agricultural and forestry projects can include:41
•
•
•
•
•

sustainable forestry management;
conservation tillage;
permanent grass plantings;
tree plantings; and
anaerobic manure digesters.

Some believe that “offsets are both a sound way to motivate the
unregulated market to reduce its emissions and to offer more costeffective means for the regulated market to achieve reduction.”42
The obvious benefit of carbon offsets is that it can generate huge
amounts of money for climate change related projects.
To illustrate the potential funding possibilities take note that:
•
•

In 2007, about $13 billion carbon offsets were purchased in the
compliance market, representing more than 800 million metric
tons of CO2 reductions.43
In 2007, between $258 and $331 million of carbon offsets were
purchased in the voluntary market.44

The offset market is growing rapidly with an “estimated sixty-five
million tons sold in the United States in 2007, valued at
approximately $337.3 million which represents a threefold increase
in value from 2006.”45
According to one study land use and forestry projects comprised
56% of all the projects funded by voluntary carbon offset
purchases.46

40 The list is derived from discussions in the paper of Melissa Papke, Michigan Forests and Farms: Tapping and Marketing
Our Land Resources for Carbon Sequestration, 36 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 61, 63 (2009)
41 The list is derived from discussions in the paper of Melissa Papke, supra note 39.
42 Id.
43 Supra note 39.
44 Id.
45 Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34
N.C.J. Int’l L. & Comp. Reg. 851, 853, (2009).
46 Harris, E., 2006. Working Paper on the Voluntary Carbon Market: Current and Future Market
Status, and Implications for Development Benefits. International Institute for Environment and
Development, London, October 2006 cited in “Voluntary Carbon Offsets—Getting What You Pay For,”
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It must be noted that “[t]he voluntary carbon offset market in the
United States has grown up in the absence of any federal cap on
GHG emissions and without the benefit of a national compliance
market.”47 Thus, one can only imagine how the market will expand
further once a mandatory federal cap and trade system is established.
Aside from generating funds, carbon offset projects “create
opportunities for innovative responses to GHG emissions by
encouraging investment in sectors not required to reduce
emissions.”48
For instance, the concept of equity micro-offsets
(“EMOs”)49 has been proposed to “reduce emissions while
improving well-being among the poor.”50 EMOs are “generated by
funding actions that reduce emissions from individuals who are at or
below the poverty level.”51
Offsets provide investments for projects that otherwise might not
get funding (aforestation, reforestation, agricultural "no till"
methods) and incentivize pollution sectors that would not
otherwise be covered under mandatory reductions (methane burns
at landfills). In this way the offset markets operate as a kind of
laboratory for testing new methodologies and emission reduction
technologies.52

Thus, offsets can make “an emissions program more cost-effective
by (1) providing an incentive for non-regulated sources to generate
emission reductions and (2) expanding emission compliance
opportunities for regulated entities.”53
It should be noted that projects funded by offsets also offer non
climate change related benefits “such as improvements in air or
water quality,”54 soil structure and help prevent erosion.55
2. What’s upsetting about offsets?
a.

Is it real?

The question most often raised is: Do offsets represent real

Testimony Of Derik Broekhoff Senior Associate World Resources Institute before the House Select Committee
On Energy Independence and Global Warming U.S. House Of Representatives 5 (18 July 2007) available at
http://pdf.wri.org/20070718_broekhoff_testimony.pdf
47 Supra note 45 at 861.
48 Supra note 45 at 857.
49 Vandenbergh et al defines EMOs as “[c]arbon credits generated in the process of improving social equity, with
the proceeds of selling credits helping the project to pay for itself.”
50 See Vandenbergh, et al, Micro-Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change
Justice, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 303 (2009)
51 Id.
52 Supra note 45 at 857.
53 Jonathan L. Ramseur, THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM:
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CONCERNS, CRS Report for Congress, Summary (2008).
54 Id.
55 Id at 14.
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emissions reductions or are we just fooling ourselves? Is it gold or
fool’s gold? How can we be sure that the offset we pay for actually
reduces GHG emissions or prevents GHG emissions from being
released into the atmosphere?
For offsets to be credible, a ton of CO2-equivalent emissions from
an offset project should equate to a ton reduced from a covered
emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. This
objective presents challenges, because many offsets are difficult to
measure. If illegitimate offset credits flow into an emissions
trading program, the program would fail to reduce GHG
emissions.56

Some offsets are criticized as “nothing but pork-barrel subsidies to
energy producers.”57 It’s said to be nothing more than “[s]ubsidizing
‘good’ energy in order to justify using ‘bad’ energy is like eating salad
in order to justify eating dessert. It is an exercise in self-deception.”58
b.

Guilt removal mechanism

Critics point out that purchasing offsets from the South allow the
North to continue profiting from greenhouse gas emitting activities.
By purchasing offsets, companies and governments need not change
GHG producing behavior. They can continue with business as usual
as their “environmental guilt” is washed away by offsets they
purchase. No wonder, offsets have been called by some as “papal
indulgences that satisfy our guilty conscience while we continue our
thirst for fossil fuel and energy use.”59
c.

Effect on the South

The opportunity to sell offsets is believed to “serve as a disincentive
for developing nations to enact laws or regulations limiting GHG
emissions.”60 Why would a developing nation establish emission
caps or regulations to reduce emissions when such regulations would
disqualify the issuance of offsets? Why would the South reduce
emissions if it will result in loss of funding?
II.

REDD Offsets
A.

What’s good about REDD offsets?
1. Provide funding for adaptation

Supra note 53.
Arnold Kling, The Political Economy of Alternative Energy 6 March 2007 available at
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=030607D accessed on 29 October 2009
58 Id.
59 Supra note 45.
60 Supra note 53 at 23.
56
57

‐ 10 ‐

One of the most contentious issues in international climate change
negotiations is: Who should pay for adaptation? The next question
may be just as contentious: How much should be paid and in what
manner? These question become more critical if effective
international measures to curb GHG emissions are not undertaken.
Under this scenario, countries would have to focus even more on
how to adapt to the climate change impacts. Studies indicate that
the South, particularly countries in Asia and Africa, will bear the
brunt of climate change impacts. This is tragic considering that the
historically the North has contributed more to the problem and the
South lack the resources to pay for their own adaptation.
If the South is able to generate REDD offset credits, it would help
fund adaptation as it would be a means to channel funds from North
to South.
It is estimated that $10 to $30 billion are required annually to address
deforestation and forest degradation at the global level.61 If you
compare this amount to the international funding for forestry which
is estimated at US$1.1 billion annually for the past ten years62 then
obviously a lot of money still needs to be raised.
The argument is that “a solid, market-based REDD system has the
potential to create a long-term, reliable source of funding to help
ensure continued land management that values intact forests.63 The
Copenhagen Accord as well as the pending U.S. climate change bills
seem to recognize this.
2. Encourage the South’s Cooperation
Another argument is that “a market-based REDD system can
encourage virtuous cycles of developing country participation,
thereby enabling deeper emissions reductions by developed
countries and greater absolute cuts globally.”64
Under the Kyoto Protocol only Annex I countries are required to
reduce emissions. These comprise countries in the North. The
main participation of the South has been as recipient of Clean
Development Mechanism projects.
As a result “developing
countries have not been able to participate meaningfully in the global
carbon market to date”65 except as recipients if projects and funds.
A system incorporating REDD allowances would engage those
countries actively in climate mitigation and yield broader
sustainability and biodiversity benefits. Further, a market-based

Supra note 26 at 14.
Supra note 18 at 1918.
63 Supra note 26 at 17.
64 Id.
65 Id.
61
62
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REDD system will broaden the universe of mitigation options,
thus reducing compliance costs globally while enabling greater
emissions reductions in industrialized countries.66

The North has been pushing for the South’s participation in
mitigation efforts, but the South is resisting this by pointing out that
this would be inequitable because emissions cuts would hamper their
development efforts. Beyond North-South politics however, studies
seem to indicate that the gravity of the climate change problem
cannot be addressed simply by emission cuts from the North alone.
Engaging in REDD projects is one way the South can participate in
mitigation efforts, without hampering its developmental goals.
3. Economically efficient
It has been argued that “deforestation and forest degradation are
fundamentally symptoms of market failure.”67 Essentially, this failure
is caused by the fact that “the economic benefits of deforestation
outweigh those of forest protection.”68
To break the cycle of destruction, it is necessary to create economic
incentives that engage land-owners and populations tied to living on the
land to protect and enhance standing forests. A market-based REDD
system has the potential to realign economic incentives to make forests
more valuable alive, intact, and functioning than dead and stripped for
short-term extractive gain.69

It is believed that “a market-based REDD system, if well designed,
should decrease compliance costs, thereby easing the transition to
more stringent targets globally.”70
4.

Environmental Co-Benefits
REDD projects can yield environmental benefits apart from GHG
mitigation. Certain types of offsets are called gourmet offsets as
opposed to minimum standard offsets.
A minimum standard makes sure that offsets are real, not double counted
and additional. Gourmet offsets are those that are sourced from projects
that adhere to strict additionality standards and have strong social and
environmental benefits (so called co-benefits or secondary benefits. Such
offsets often fetch a considerably higher price in the voluntary carbon
market.71

B.

What’s wrong with REDD offsets?

Id.
Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL, MAKING SENSE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET: A
COMPARISON OF CARBON OFFSET STANDARDS, 28 WWF Germany (2008)
66
67
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While offsets for reforestation were permitted under the Kyoto Protocol
projects to prevent deforestation were excluded because the parties were
skeptical about these projects for a number of reasons. The main reasons
for the skepticism and/or opposition are discussed below.
1. Leakage
Leakage happens when deforestation or forest degradation is simply
moved to another place because of a REDD project in one area.
The net result is that GHG emissions are not mitigated, but simply
transferred elsewhere. Thus a REDD project “that restricts timber
harvesting at a specific site may boost logging at an alternative
location, thus reducing the effectiveness of the offset project.”72
While the risk of leakage is present for all types of offset projects, it
is believed that “[c]ompared to other offset types, forestry projects,
particularly those that sequester carbon by curbing logging, likely
present the greatest risk of leakage.73
One way of looking at leakage is that it “is a project’s unintended
effects on GHG emissions outside the project’s boundaries.”74 Thus,
a national policy against deforestation may prevent leakage within a
country but international leakage is another matter altogether. Thus,
the more countries participate in REDD projects the lesser the risk
of leakage.
2. Non-Permanence
While some trees can live a very long time, forests are vulnerable to
natural disasters which can release the carbon stored in them.
Proponents of carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) technologies for
power plants argue that unlike CCS the carbon sequestered would
eventually be released in due time. How then can anyone issue
offsets covering temporarily captured carbon?
In addition, “[o]ffset buyers need some assurance that the land set
aside for forests (and carbon sequestration) will not be used for a
conflicting purpose (e.g., logging or urban development) in the
future.”75 They need to be assured that after profiting from offsets,
certain governments would not seek further profits by cutting the
trees down or that adequate safeguards are made to protect these
trees from natural disasters.
3. Questionable Additionality
Additionality … refers to “whether an offset project really creates
“additional” CO2 sequestration that would not have occurred in the

Supra note 53 at 21.
Id.
74 Supra note 71 at 20.
75 Supra note 53 at 21.
72
73
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absence of a market for offsets.”76 When offsets are issued though
there is no additionality, the result in a net increase in GHG
emissions.77
The questions that needs to be answered is this: How can there be
additionality for REDD projects if “the practice being undertaken
would be economically efficient or desirable for the landowner even
in the absence of the ability to sell as an offset”?78
To illustrate, imagine a situation where Alpha, a manufacturing
company wants to reduce the impact of the GHG emissions of its
business by purchasing offsets from Omega, a company engaged in a
REDD project. In essence, Alpha is paying Omega to reduce
emissions on its behalf. However, if Omega would have undertaken
the REDD project anyway, Alpha did not really pay for any
additional emissions reductions. It would have happened anyway
even without Alpha’s payment.
Determining additionality can be very difficult. In making such
additionality assessments one does “involve some degree of
subjectivity, which may lead to inconsistent additionality
determinations.”79
4. Methodological Issues
One question every REDD offset proponent must answer is: How
did you compute the amount of carbon stored in particular forest
the REDD offset covers? Developing the methodologies to account
for the amount of carbon sequestered from the atmosphere by a
particular technology can be difficult. The degree of difficulty can
be greater when dealing with biological sequestration methods such
as REDD projects.
Biological sequestration offset projects may present particular
challenges in terms of measurement. The carbon cycle in trees and
soils is only partially understood. Variations exist across tree
species, ages, soil conditions, geographic locations, and
management practices. Estimates of carbon uptake and storage are
frequently considered imprecise or unreliable.80

It may be simpler to compute for carbon sequestration by CCS
facilities, after all these are man-made devices with meters, gauges
and digital displays. But it’s not the same when dealing with a forest.
5. Prejudices local communities

Supra note 39.
Supra note 2 at 58.
78 Supra note 39.
79 Supra note 53 at 19.
80 Supra note 53 at 19 -20.
76
77
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Some believe that the benefits of REDD will not be felt by the
communities that live in or around the forests because such benefits
“may be captured by national governments or corrupt, elite, local
and national figures”81 and to make matters worse “local
communities will lose the livelihoods they derive from forests.”82
A concern is that by ascribing a carbon value to natural vegetation,
the land and resource use rights of indigenous people may again be
forfeited, even if the vegetation is conserved. At a minimum,
indigenous and forest people may not receive an equitable share of
the value of the carbon.83

The concern is that REDD offsets will create an incentive for
corrupt governments in the South to displace local communities to
derive profits from REDD projects.
6. Purely an economic efficiency measure
Perhaps the strongest criticism lodged against REDD offsets is that
they are often issued not based “on ecological necessity, sustainable
development needs, or on the legal/ethical obligation of common
but differentiated responsibility [but] on economic efficiency.”84
The criteria for much international climate change "aid" is not
necessarily about mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, helping
developing nations or poor communities adapt, or conserving
biodiversity. Instead, a coterie of actors with overlapping interests
has devised complex systems that turn environmental obligations
into efficient economic transactions.85

REDD offsets are believed to “often focus on economic expediency
as the primary criterion in mitigation and adaptation, while doing
little to help the poor adapt, which is exactly the opposite of what
[Common But Differentiated Responsibility] proposes and
requires.”86 The issue goes into the very motivation for REDD
offsets: Is the funded project established for environmental or
economic reasons? This issue strikes at the heart of whether or not
REDD offsets are truly green.

C.

Evaluation of REDD offsets
1. Good news, bad news
The main strength of REDD offsets is that it offers a way to fund the
preservation and protection of forests and a number of other adaptation

Supra note 2 at 58.
Id.
83 Bill Hare & Kirsten Macey, Tropical Deforestation Emissions Reduction Mechanism, Greenpeace 27 (2007).
84 Supra note 2 at 41.
85 Id.
86 Id.
81
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projects that the South would otherwise not be able to accomplish.
Funding is extremely important for the South. During the months leading
up to the Copenhagen conference countries from the South, particularly
Africa, made it abundantly clear that the North must pay for the
adaptation in the South. To a certain extent the North recognizes this with
the most generous offer coming from the EU.
Apart from cash, the goodwill created by the North’s support for REDD
offsets generated by the South is also a welcome side effect and may help
oil the wheels of diplomacy during international treaty negotiations not
only for climate change but for other issues as well. The North and South
has had a tumultuous relationship beyond the climate change issue and the
REDD offset mechanism may be one way the North and South can create
bridges instead of walls. REDD offsets seems to be a measure where
interests of North and South seem to converge.
At the domestic level, funding the preservation of forests may be a more
politically acceptable method of reducing emissions for the constituencies
of the North. A carbon tax would be unpopular and cap and trade would
raise a howl from affected industries. Paying for preserving forests may be
easier to sell to the electorate.
On the other hand, REDD offsets suffer from the same objections raised
against all carbon offsets. The problems of leakage, lack of permanence
and additionality are problems that can seriously undermine mitigation
efforts. Unless these issues are addressed, the effectiveness of REDD as a
mitigation measure will remain in doubt. The methodological issues
involving carbon offsets in general are daunting. The fact that REDD
offsets deal with natural ecosystems magnifies the difficulties. REDD
offsets may aggravate the problem by making REDD projects too enticing
before adequate methodologies and technologies are developed to ensure
their integrity.
In addition, allowing the North to purchase REDD offsets from the South
to comply with emissions reductions goals may create an incentive for
countries in the South to engage in a “race to the bottom” wherein each of
them competes the others to become the cheapest source of offsets.
Gourmet offsets are too expensive and unless required by law, the market for
them would be limited to only the most conscientious. So the South may
offer “fire sales” of REDD offsets.
Finally, the push for REDD offsets appear to be driven more by economic
benefits rather than environmental protection. The whole idea behind
market-based mechanisms is to make environmental compliance cheaper
and perhaps more efficient. The market has never been designed to
protect public goods. Its not a good sign that the foremost advocates for
REDD offsets are businessmen, lawyers, and economists while the most
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vocal opposition comes from some environmental groups.87 While the
protagonists of a debate do not necessarily determine which side is right,
the identities of the proponents and oppositors of the REDD debate
should give one sufficient reason to pause and consider whether REDD
offsets are really green.
Thus, although REDD offsets may have benefits for purposes of
adaptation funding, diplomacy and international relations and domestic
support, the arguments seem to weigh heavily against the effectiveness of
REDD offsets as a climate change mitigation measure.
2.

Facing the Facts

Despite its current weaknesses, REDD offsets appear to be a reality that
the law must seek to address. The reality is that REDD offsets have begun
to be generated and traded in some markets even without law requiring
their purchase or issuance. Despite the uncertainties, there is a perception
that REDD offsets are legitimate mitigation measures. Otherwise
wouldn’t governments prohibit their issuance or sale? The absence of
legislation may be considered as tacit governmental acceptance of their
legitimacy if not their effectiveness. There is therefore a need for laws and
regulation to prescribe standards to prevent the generation and trade of
such offsets in a manner that will undermine other efforts to reduce
emissions. The genie has been let out of the bottle or Pandora’s box has
been opened so to speak and must be dealt with.
A pragmatic approach to REDD offsets may be what is appropriate at this
time. It has been argued that macro-transformations88 are required to
effectively deal with climate change impacts. These macrotransformations:
will require substantial modifications to global and national public and private
climate change governance schemes, and will require integration of GHG
emissions reduction goals into many policies and institutions that are now
unaffected by GHG considerations…89

As the recently concluded Copenhagen conference demonstrates, these
needed macro-transformations will take time. REDD offsets may be part
of a suite of measures designed to address greenhouse gas emissions in the
short term while these macro-transformations are being negotiated and
worked out.
III. Writing the REDD Law

87 Foremost of these groups which oppose REDD offsets is Greenpeace. Though there are environmental groups
that are amenable to some for form of carbon offset , the point is that the most vocal opposition is from
environmental groups and not business groups.
88 See Vandenbergh, supra note 50.
89 Supra note 50 at 308.
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As discussed earlier, despite the current risks involving REDD offsets, it is
advisable that national legislation to be drafted to govern them. A market for
REDD offsets exists even in the absence of legislation requiring them. Thus, it
is in fact because of the risks involving REDD offsets that makes specific
legislation necessary.
A.

REDD Content
1. Prescribe standards
One of the strongest criticisms against offsets in general is the
multiple standards used for evaluating offsets. According to one
count, there are “at least ten carbon offset protocols and
certification programs from which to choose, each with its own set
of certification standards.”90
Some of these offset standards include:91
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The CDM standard used for the Kyoto Protocol;
The Gold Standard developed by the World Wildlife Fund;
The Voluntary Carbon Standard managed by the VCS
association;
The VER+ standard developed by TÜV SÜD;
The CCX standard;
The Voluntary Offset Standard launched by the International
Carbon Investors and Services;
The CDM Afforestation and Reforestation Standard (CDM
A/R);
The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards developed
by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance;
Plan Vivo developed by Edinburgh Centre for Carbon
Management.

Obviously, the “lack of a single, standardized certification program
for carbon offsets creates consumer confusion and the potential for
fraud in the market.”92 Therefore, establishing “a uniform
certification system will address consumer protection concerns, and,
assuming the standard is reliable and effective, will also address
concerns about the quality of offsets. 93 It should be remembered
that because of the nature offsets as intangible goods “their value
and integrity depend entirely on how they are defined, represented,
and guaranteed.” 94
It has been argued that there are three sets of standards that must be
established “to create a true carbon offset ‘commodity’: (1)
accounting standards; (2) monitoring and verification standards; and
Supra note 45 at 855.
Supra note 71.
92 Supra note 45 at 855-856.
93 Id at 867.
94 Supra note 46 at 6.
90
91
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(3) registration and enforcement systems.”95
a.

Accounting standards
An accounting standard “include definitions and rules for the
elements that are essential during the design and early
implementation phase of a project”96 and should address the
following issues:
i. whether an offset represents and actual reduction in GHG
emissions thereby “ensuring that a ton of emission reductions
from one project is the same as a ton from another, and
ensure that offsets are ‘real, surplus, and permanent.’97
ii. whether an offset project complies with the additionality
requirement or “whether the purchase of emission reductions
really enabled (or induced) a project to happen, or whether the
purchase is essentially being wasted on a project that would
have happened anyway.”98
As discussed earlier, determining additionality can be difficult
but it is not insurmountable. There exists at least “two distinct
approaches to additionality testing: Project based additionality
testing and performance standards.”99 The former “evaluates each
individual project on a case by case basis”100 while the latter
“use aggregated data on project or technology characteristics
to establish a threshold … that must be met or exceeded in
order for a project to be deemed additional.”101 An example of
project based additionality testing is determining whether the
project is “implemented to fulfill official policies, regulations,
or industry standards.”102 If so it cannot be considered
additional. But if “the project goes beyond compliance”103 it
may be additional, subject to more tests. On the other hand, an
example of a performance standard test is the emissions-based
(benchmark) additionality test which “establishes a generic
baseline scenario − referred to as a benchmark − against which
all projects of a given type are assessed.”104

b.

Monitoring and Verification Standards
Determining on paper whether an offset project will produce
benefits is one thing, that it actually produces such benefits in

Id at 7.
Supra note 71 at 14.
97 Supra note 46 at 7.
98 Id at 8.
99 Supra note 71 at 15.
100 Id.
101 Id at 16.
102 Id at 15.
103 Id.
104 Id at 16.
95
96
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reality is another matter.
Monitoring and verification standards are required to ensure
that offset projects perform as expected and to quantify
their actual emission reductions. Monitoring protocols are
generally developed in conjunction with accounting
protocols. Verification usually requires the services of a
third-party professional verifier, or a government regulator.
If third-party verifiers are used, they need to meet minimum
qualifications and have some expertise related to the types
of projects they are verifying.105

Certification rules may also be included as part of monitoring
and verification.
Certification rules are used to quantify the actual carbon
savings that can enter the market once the project is up and
running. There is sometimes a lag time between the start of
a project and when it starts producing carbon offsets. This
is especially true for forestry projects – the trees have to
grow for a few years before they have absorbed enough
carbon that can be quantified and sold.106

c.

Registration and Enforcement Standards
Registration and enforcement standards “ensure that carbon
offsets are only sold once and clarify ownership and enable
trading of offsets.”107 The registries keep track of offsets and
clarify ownership of offsets.108
These registries should:
•
•
•

2.

contain publicly available information that can be used
to uniquely identify offset projects;109
provide a mechanism to assign unique identifiers to
offset credits generated by each project;110 and
include a system to transparently track the ownership
and status of offset credits.111

Independent Validator
Ordinarily “the competing interests of buyer and seller create checks
and balances”112 in a given market. Unfortunately this does not work
in the carbon market.

Supra note 46 at 8.
14 WWF Germany (2008)
107 Supra note 71 at 14.
108 Supra note 71 at 39.
109 Supra note 46 at 8 (18 July 2007) available at http://pdf.wri.org/20070718_broekhoff_testimony.pdf
110 Supra note 46
111 Id.
112 Supra note 71 at 33.
105
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Although there is competition on pricing … since both
the supplier and buyer of carbon offsets aim to maximize the
number of offsets produced, there is a strong financial incentive for
both supplier and buyer to overestimate the baseline scenario and
thus artificially inflate emission credits to increase profitability…
Free markets are not designed to protect public goods. Neither
suppliers nor buyers of carbon offsets can therefore be reasonably
expected to act altruistically and conservatively estimate a project’s
reductions, as this would directly translate into decreased profits.113

This inherent flaw of project-based carbon trading
systems can be resolved by an independent validator who will ensure
that the prescribed standards are enforced.
3.

Safeguards

Safeguards must be included to address the concerns regarding the
lack of permanence of forest captured carbon, the possibility of prejudice
suffered by local forest communities and environmental concerns.
a.

Permanence buffer

It may be advisable “to establish some type of permanence buffer, or
insurance pool, to deal with fluctuations and variability in generating
emission reductions nationally and from site-based activities.”114
b.

Benefits-sharing mechanisms

There are a number of stakeholders in any given forested area.
These stakeholders include “different government agencies, levels of
government (i.e., national to local), indigenous peoples,
communities, private landowners, or companies may have some
rights or claims that may conflict with overall REDD goals”115 which
“must be addressed and adequate and equitable compensation or
benefits-sharing arrangements negotiated.”116
c.

Alignment with other environment laws, policies and standards.

There are a number of environmental laws, policies and standards
which will have an impact on and will be impacted by REDD-related
legislation.
Environmental laws regarding environmental and social-impact
assessments should also be revisited in light of REDD and forestcarbon attributes overall…There are numerous laws governing the
extractive industries, including agriculture, forestry, mining, oil and
gas development, and sources of energy, such as biofuels or hydroelectric. These laws should be reviewed and aligned with national
REDD goals to ensure consistency and to avoid unintended

Id.
Supra note 26 at 16.
115 Id.
116 Id.
113
114
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consequences and counter-incentives.117

B.

U.S. Climate Change Bills
The following discussion evaluates the content of the current U.S.
climate change related bills to the extent that these address the
concerns regarding REDD offsets.
1.

Waxman-Markey
Section 311 of Waxman-Markey amends the Clean Air Act by
adding “Title VII Global Warming Pollution Reduction
Program.” Part D of this proposed Title VII is on “Offsets.”
The key provisions of Part D are discussed below.
a.

Offsets Integrity Advisory Board

Section 731 of Part D provides for the establishment of an
independent Offsets Integrity Advisory Board (“Advisory
Board”) which will “make recommendations to the
Administrator for use in promulgating and revising regulations
… and for ensuring the overall environmental integrity of the
programs established pursuant to those regulations.”118
The Advisory Board is empowered: (i) to provide
recommendations to the Administrator regarding offset
project types that should be considered for eligibility; and (ii)
make available to the Administrator and other relevant Federal
agencies its advice and comments on offsets related issues.119
The Advisory Board is also required to:
i.

ii.

b.
117

Id.

Section 731 (a).
Section 731 (c).
120 Section 731 (d).
118
119

review approved and potential methodologies, scientific
studies, offset project monitoring, offset project
verification reports, and audits and evaluate the net
emissions effects of implemented offset projects.
recommend changes to offset methodologies, protocols,
or project types, or to the overall offset program to
ensure that offset credits issued by the Administrator do
not compromise the integrity of the annual emission
reductions established under section 703, and to avoid
or minimize adverse effects to human health or the
environment.120
Offsets Program and Regulations
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Section 732 “[d]irects the Administrator to establish an offsets
program and requires that regulations ensure offsets are
verifiable, additional, and permanent.”121 The same section
also requires the Administrator, “in consultation with
appropriate Federal agencies and taking into consideration the
recommendations of the Advisory Board” to “promulgate
regulations establishing a program for the issuance of offset
credits in accordance with the requirements of this part.”122 In
general, these regulations inter alia must:
(1)

(2)
(3)

authorize the issuance of offset credits with respect to
qualifying offset projects that result in reductions or
avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions, or
sequestration of greenhouse gases;
ensure that such offset credits represent verifiable and
additional greenhouse gas emission reductions or
avoidance, or increases in sequestration;
ensure that offset credits issued for sequestration offset
projects are only issued for greenhouse gas reductions
that are permanent.123

More specifically, the regulations must include rules on
standardized methodologies and verification of offset credits.
i.

Standardized Methodologies

For each type of eligible offset project, the regulations must
provide for the establishment of the standardized
methodologies:
•

•
•

•

for determining the additionality of greenhouse gas
emission reductions or avoidance, or greenhouse gas
sequestration, achieved by an offset project of that
type.124
for establishing activity baselines for offset projects of
that type.125
for determining the extent to which greenhouse gas
emission reductions or avoidance, or greenhouse gas
sequestration, achieved by an offset project of that type
exceed a relevant activity baseline, including protocols
for monitoring and accounting for uncertainty.126
for accounting for and mitigating potential leakage, if
any, from an offset project of that type, taking

Section 732 (a).
Section 732 (a).
123 Section 732 (b)
124 Section 734 (a) (1).
125 Section 734 (a) (2). For this purpose, “[t]he Administrator shall set activity baselines to reflect a conservative
estimate of business-as-usual performance or practices for the relevant type of activity such that the baseline
provides an adequate margin of safety to ensure the environmental integrity of offsets calculated in reference to
such baseline.”
126 Section 734 (a) (3).
121
122
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uncertainty into account.127
ii.

Verification of offset credits

The Administrator is mandated to establish
requirements, including protocols, for verification of the
quantity of greenhouse gas emission reductions or avoidance,
or sequestration of greenhouse gases, resulting from an offset
project.128 Specifically:
The regulations shall require that an offset project developer shall
submit a report, prepared by a third-party verifier accredited under
subsection (d), providing such information as the Administrator
requires to determine the quantity of greenhouse gas emission
reductions or avoidance, or sequestration of greenhouse gases,
resulting from the offset project.129

The subsection (d) referred to pertains to the provision on
“Verifier Accreditation” which mandates the Administrator to
establish a process and requirements for periodic accreditation
of third-party verifiers.
In addition to the regulations and as part of the Offsets
Program the Administrator will establish an Of fset Registr y
“for qualifying offset projects and offset credits issued with
respect thereto under this part.” Section 733 further requires
the Administrator to establish, and at its option130 periodically
revise, “a list of types of projects eligible to generate offset
credits, including international offset credits.”131
c.

Accounting For Reversals

Section 734 mandates the Administrator to establish, for each
type of listed eligible sequestration project, the requirements
to account for and address reversals and prescribe mechanisms
to ensure that any sequestration with respect to which an
offset credit is issued under this part results in a permanent
net increase in sequestration, and that full account is taken of
any actual or potential reversal of such sequestration, with an
adequate margin of safety.
One of the mechanisms must be an offsets reserve, which is a
program under which, before issuance of offset credits the
Administrator shall subtract and reserve from the quantity to

Section 734 (a) (4)
Section 736 (a).
129 Section 736 (a).
130 In Section 733 (a) (1) and 733 (b) on modification of the list the term used is “may” and not “shall.”
131 In Section 733 (a) (1).
127
128
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be issued a quantity of offset credits based on the risk of
reversal.132
d.

Environmental Consideration for Forestry offsets

In the event the Administrator lists forestry or other relevant
land management-related offset projects as eligible offset
project types, the Administrator must promulgate regulations
for the selection and use of species in such offset projects:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

e.

to ensure that native species are given primary consideration
in such projects;
to enhance biological diversity in such projects;
to prohibit the use of federally designated or State-designated
noxious weeds;
to prohibit the use of a species listed by a regional or State
invasive plant authority within the applicable region or State;
and
in the case of forestry offset projects, in accordance with
widely accepted, environmentally sustainable forestry
practices.133

International offset credits

Section 743 authorizes the Administrator, in consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, to issue
international offset credits based on activities that reduce or
avoid greenhouse gas emissions, or increase sequestration of
greenhouse gases, in a developing country. Project designed to
reduce GHG emissions through activities to reduce
deforestation are qualified for international offset credits
provided it complies with the requirements prescribed by the
law.134
f.

Offsets from reduced deforestation

In addition to the requirements applicable for all international

Section 734 (b) (3).
Section 741.
134 The requirements prescribed by Waxman-Markey are found in Section 743 (b) (2) which states:
132
133

(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL OFFSET CREDITS.—The Administrator may issue
international offset credits only if—
“(A) the United States is a party to a bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement that includes the country in
which the project or measure achieving the relevant greenhouse gas emission reduction or avoidance, or
greenhouse gas sequestration, has occurred;
“(B) such country is a developing country; and
“(C) such agreement or arrangement—
“(i) ensures that the requirements of this part apply to the issuance of international offset credits under this section;
and
“(ii) provides for the appropriate distribution of international offset credits issued.
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offset credits, offsets from reduced deforestation must comply
with additional requirements pertaining primarily to the
location of activities, methodologies and standards employed
and eligibility of the developing countries involved.135
It should be noted that the Waxman Markey bill, includes
provisions on assisting developing countries combat
deforestation in “Part E – Supplemental Emissions
Reductions From Reduced Deforestation” of the proposed
Title VII. However these provisions appear to contemplate
programs funded through aid programs rather than through
the generation or trading of offsets and is therefore outside
the scope of this paper.
2.

The Kerry-Boxer bill
The Kerry Boxer Bill amends the Clean Air Act by adding
“Title VII – Global Warming Pollution Reduction and
Investment Program” which includes “Part D – Offsets.”
a.

Offsets Integrity Advisory Board

Similar to the Waxman-Markey bill the Kerry-Boxer bill
provides for an Offsets Integrity Advisory Board, except that
the Advisory Board in this case makes recommendations
directly to the President.
b.

Offsets Program and Regulations

In the Kerry-Boxer bill it is the President, in consultation with
appropriate Federal agencies and taking into consideration the
recommendations of the Advisory Board, who promulgates
the regulations establishing a program for the issuance of
offset credits.
Essentially, the various duties of the Administrator provided
for under Waxman-Markey are given to the President under
Kerry-Boxer.
The Kerry-Boxer bill also provides for an Offsets registry and
a listing of eligible projects. However, Kerry-Boxer provision
includes a list of specific projects that may be considered.
The Kerry-Boxer bill also has similar provisions to the
Waxman-Markey bill on standardized methodologies,
verification of offset credits, accounting for reversals,
international offset credits, offsets from reduced deforestation,
environmental integrity and existing methodologies.
135
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c.

Office of Offsets Integrity

An innovation of the Kerry-Boxer bill is the establishment of
an Office of Offsets Integrity within the Department of
Justice. This office is tasked with supervising and coordinating
investigations and civil enforcement of the carbon offsets
program; ensuring that Federal law relating to civil
enforcement of the carbon offsets program is used to the
fullest extent authorized; and ensuring that adequate resources
are made available for the investigation and enforcement of
civil violations of the carbon offsets program.136
3.

Analysis and Evaluation of the Bills
It appears that both bills include provisions that seek to
address the major objections to offsets in general. It seems
that most of the substantial objections to REDD offsets are
addressed through rule-making and regulation. However,
while the bills prescribe certain standards, much of the
standard setting has been delegated to the relevant government
agency. Therefore it remains to be seen whether the
regulations that will be promulgated would be sufficient to
deal with the objections to offsets. Thus, on paper, the bills
appear to address the REDD offsets issues.

IV.

Conclusion: Are REDD offsets really green?

This paper set out to evaluate whether the issuance REDD offsets mechanism is an
effective climate change mitigation measure.
As discussed in Part II, REDD offset mechanism offers tangible benefits but it would
seem that the issuance of REDD offsets is primarily motivated by economic efficiency
rather than by ecological necessity. Its main benefit is to act as channel for funds from
the North to flow to the South. Of course it can also be argued that because REDD
offsets provide funds for forest conservation projects, the South can allocate its limited
resources on other mitigation and adaptation measures. But this remains to be seen.
Therefore, it appears that it is fair to state that REDD offsets only appears as an
effective climate change mitigation measure. It is therefore not “green” in that sense.
Painted green perhaps or made to appear green but not really green. Under current
circumstances REDD offsets do not appear to advance mitigation efforts even if it
purports to advance REDD projects. This is because REDD offsets aggravates the
limitations of REDD projects. This it does by creating incentives for behavior which
have to potential to undermine mitigation efforts.
But because it is not really green does not mean that REDD offsets should be stricken
off climate change legislation. On the contrary, it is because it is not really green that
136

Section 743.
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law should specifically regulate it. As discussed in Part II, carbon offsets is a reality
even without legislation. To prevent carbon offsets from undermining really green
measures, it must be regulated.
In Part III, this paper analyzed whether the major US Climate Change bills provide
sufficient regulation for REDD offsets. As far as statutory standards go, it would seem
so. There appears to be sufficient statutory authority to provide rule-making and
regulatory functions to limit the dangers of REDD offsets and maximize its benefits.
But the litmus test of the effectiveness of the law would be the regulations that would
be promulgated and how these would be enforced. Whether these regulations and
their enforcement would be green remains to be seen.

